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ABSTRACT 
This report discusses the findings of the Nett Warrior (NW) C3Conflict 
experiment and its implications for the NW Basis of Issue (BOI).  The experiment used 
the C3Conflict war game to elicit and contrast measures of leader performance across 
two conditions that simulated alternative BOI for NW.  C3Conflict is a distributed, 
computer-based, multiplayer, small unit war game designed to elicit measures of leader 
performance focusing on command, control, and communication.  In the fully  
NW-enabled condition, the C3Conflict interface simulated the information and 
communication enabled by NW and made this package available to three soldiers—one 
in the role of Squad Leader (SL) and two in the role of Team Leader (TL).  In contrast, in 
the partially NW-enabled condition, C3Conflict made that package available only to SL; 
the interface for the two TL simulated the limitations of line-of-sight vision.  Eighteen 
hypotheses were tested.  All predicted that unit performance would be better in the fully 
NW-enabled condition.  Ten were confirmed.  No measures showed superiority for the 
partially NW-enabled condition.  These findings support the argument that the fully  
NW-enabled BOI improves squad-level communications, coordination, and maneuvers.  
In the discussion section, these results are interpreted to reveal that the fully-enabled BOI 
is the preferable option for two reasons.  First, if SLs use the full range of capabilities 
offered by NW, their workload is likely to decrease.  Second, the fully-enabled BOI 
promotes the autonomy and battlefield awareness of TLs.  Fully-enabled TLs are likely to 
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The Nett Warrior (NW) system is emergent wireless technology designed to 
enhance battlefield awareness.  This experiment focused on determining the benefit of 
one of several NW system capabilities—a near-real time common operational picture 
(COP) that includes friendly position and operational graphics.  A soldier enabled by this 
common sense of position and purpose is likely to feel empowered, relevant,  
and important. 
Previous analyses have found that NW can have three beneficial impacts on the 
capability of leaders of dismounted soldiers:  (1) it can enhance navigation; (2) it can 
provide a shared operational picture; and (3) it can alter and improve modes of command 
and control (C2).  These capability enhancements are discussed in turn. 
To enhance dismounted navigation, NW provides the leader with self-scaling, 
high-resolution maps or digital imagery.  Superimposed on that map or image is an icon 
that represents his GPS-based location and orientation.  The system also allows the leader 
to compare his current icon location with geo-referenced way points (digital 
“chemlights”) and other graphic control measures.  The leader can place chemlights on 
the display for a variety of purposes including, but not limited to, laying a track for 
soldiers to follow and marking enemy positions.  The helmet-mounted display provides 
easy access to the map for continuous or quick nonobtrusive location tracking  
during movements. 
Up-to-date operational graphics and symbols of both friendly and enemy forces 
remain the cornerstone of the COP and effective C2.  To provide a COP, NW provides 
access during all phases of an operation to large quantities of preloaded, self-scaling,  
geo-referenced digital maps and imagery files that are annotated with operational 
graphics and symbols.  The leader can quickly zoom (in or out) from a regional view 
(e.g., a 1:250,000 resolution map or aerial photo) to 1-meter or even submeter-level 
imagery for maximum clarity and detail at the decisive point during an operation. 
NW supports the continuous updating of graphics and symbols across the tactical 
communications network.  It is able to display an individual icon for every NW-enabled 
leader within a designated organization.  This enhanced visibility of subordinate and 
adjacent units that are often beyond the line of sight, which may be set in position or 
maneuvering, in real time, is a powerful mitigation against fratricide.  Leaders are better 
able to direct and control the application of lethal assets in relation to friendly forces.  To 
prevent cluttering the display with detail and unwanted information, NW provides a 
filtering capability that each individual leader can use to scale and tailor his display to fit 
his assessment of his current C2 needs. 
To enhance C2, NW provides the digital “chemlight,” a simple and highly 
adaptable method for describing and directing action.  The leader can use chemlights to 
coordinate the efforts of his NW-enabled subordinates in order to coordinate unit 
navigation, to conduct precise operations, or to focus combat power.  The leader can also 
use chemlights to post significant information on the digital display such as the locations 
 2 
of potential threats, of cleared or friendly occupied structures, of the initial location of 
enemy contact, of intended movement routes, and of other features on the battlefield.  
When combined with voice or radio transmission of directives, digital chemlights can 
provide additional clarity and augment soldier understanding.  This capability all but 
eliminates the need for the “leader huddle” that has historically been used to gather 
leaders at a central location to explain and diagram the tactical plan for subordinates. 
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II. THE RESEARCH ISSUE 
The Army is committed to fielding NW, but has yet to resolve its Basis of Issue 
(BOI).  This study investigates two BOIs.  The partial BOI provides NW to  
Squad Leaders (SLs), but not to their subordinate Team Leaders (TLs).  The more 
inclusive full BOI is to provide NW to TLs as well.  A third option (that is not studied 
here) is the legacy system, in which SLs and TLs rely on paper maps, information from 
the Global Position System (GPS), and radio communications to estimate the locations of  
friendly forces. 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center (TRAC) Monterey 
has been assigned the responsibility of evaluating the potential benefits of NW and of 
assessing the alternative BOI.  This task involves gathering empirical evidence that 
documents the potential benefits to be realized by adopting the alternative BOI for 
distributing NW to rifle squads. 
The research question addressed here is whether rifle squad effectiveness is likely 
to be influenced by the availability and distribution of NW within a squad.  Specifically, 
it contrasts the exercise of C2 by squads that are partially NW-enabled (only SLs have 
been issued NW) and by squads that are fully NW-enabled (SLs and TLs have been 
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III. HYPOTHESES 
To inform the BOI decision, we built upon previous work to develop hypotheses 
that predicted when, where, and how the fully-enabled BOI would be likely to improve 
squad performance.  In August 2009, MAJ Paul F. Evangelista, USA, of TRAC 
Monterey, presented an analysis of the advantages provided by NW (Evangelista, 2009).  
The brief identified nine emergent behaviors that are likely to be beneficially affected by 
deployment of NW. 
 Coordinated unit navigation 
 Emplacement and adjustment of tactical positions 
 Conduct precise operations 
 Reinforcement of an engaged unit 
 Clearance of indirect fire 
 Autonomous/decentralized movement 
 Leader’s recon remotely translated (chemlights and updated graphics) 
 Communication during movement (chemlights and text messages) 
 Marking of enemy positions on a COP 
This list guided the specification of hypotheses to be tested, the specification of 
measures to test those hypotheses, and the design of the experiment.  This section 
motivates and describes the 18 hypotheses that emerged from this analysis. 
Constraints on the conduct of the experiment also guided the specification of 
hypotheses.  The primary constraint was the focus on rifle squads and on squad-level 
(rather than platoon- or brigade-level) performance.  Other constraints were the limited 
availability of active duty soldiers who could serve as participants, the modest budget, 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the C3Conflict experimental platform. 
A. COORDINATED UNIT NAVIGATION 
The first emergent behavior, coordinated unit navigation, concerns the leader’s 
ability to control the movement of multiple units across the battlefield in a decentralized 
and synchronized manner.  As the SL was the only leader to participate in the study, 
coordination was restricted to the synchronization of movement by the two TLs and of 
his own.  The experiment tested three hypotheses relevant to the impact of the alternative 
BOI on the SL’s attempts to control the movement of his squad.  We expected the SL in 
the fully NW-enabled condition to (1) call for fewer huddles (in-field briefs), (2) issue 
fewer commands to steer the squad, and (3) issue fewer commands of all kinds.  Here and 
elsewhere in this report we use the letter N to represent the observed count (a number) of 
the event of interest. 
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 N huddles (at dismount and during mission)  full < partial 
 N commands to change course during maneuver full < partial 
 N commands of all kinds during maneuver full < partial 
B. EMPLACEMENT AND ADJUSTMENT OF TACTICAL POSITIONS 
The second emergent behavior concerns the exercise of C2 required to emplace 
the squad at its intended location.  Control takes time and effort.  We expected squads in 
the fully NW-enabled condition to take less time to move out and to reach the intended 
location when moving from a dismount location to a cordon position and when adjusting 
position following receipt of a fragmentary order (FRAGO).  Further, we expected SLs to 
issue fewer commands to fine-tune the squad’s position: 
 Time to move out following FRAGO to adjust position full < partial 
 Time to reach cordon position full < partial 
 N commands to correct positioning full < partial 
C. CONDUCT PRECISE OPERATIONS 
This emergent behavior concerns the quality of executing a scheme of maneuver, 
especially in time-sensitive missions.  The precision of movement can be seen as the 
outcome of the leader’s attempts to coordinate unit navigation.  The experiment tested 
three hypotheses relevant to the impact of the alternative BOI on the outcomes of the 
SL’s attempts to control the movement of his squad.  Two of the hypotheses spring from 
the prediction that NW-enabled TLs will adhere more closely to the line specified and 
followed by the SL.  If this holds, then both the average and maximum separation of the 
lines taken by the TLs from the line taken by their SL will be less in the fully  
NW-enabled condition.  Finally, we expected the extra distance traveled by TLs when 
compared to the line taken by their SL to be smaller in the fully NW-enabled condition. 
 Average separation of TL lines from SL line full < partial 
 Maximum separation of TL lines for SL line full < partial 
 Extra distance traveled full < partial 
D. REINFORCEMENT OF AN ENGAGED UNIT 
This emergent behavior concerns the actions taken by a unit that seeks to 
reinforce a unit that is taking live fire.  These actions include selecting the direction of 
approach (from behind, from the side) and taking high ground.  The goals of these actions 
are to reduce the likelihood of fratricide, while speeding an effective reinforcement.  
Because C3Conflict does not emulate live fire well, it was not possible to test hypotheses 
about the likelihood of fratricide.  It was, however, possible to test two hypotheses about 
the speed with which a squad reinforces a unit taking direct fire.  We expected squads in 
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the fully NW-enabled condition to be quicker both to respond to the order to reinforce 
another squad and to reach a position where they could engage the enemy: 
 Elapsed time to move out following FRAGO to reinforce full < partial 
 Elapsed time to reach position full < partial 
E. CLEARANCE OF INDIRECT FIRE 
The fifth emergent behavior concerns the minimization or elimination of fratricide 
during artillery bombardment.  The experiment focused on C2 in rifle squads and did not 
address this topic. 
F. COMMUNICATION DURING MOVEMENT 
The sixth emergent behavior concerns the content of the messages used by the SL 
to coordinate the squad’s navigation.  The focus here is on what is said in the exercise of 
C2.  In the fully NW-enabled condition, but not in the partially NW-enabled condition, 
the SL can use the digital chemlights to specify the path to be followed.  Further, the 
presence of a chemlight trail on the enhanced digital map should reduce the need for 
verbal directives that instruct TLs to move in a cardinal (e.g., north) or relative (e.g., to 
the left) direction.  The experiment tested both of these hypotheses: 
 Directives to follow a track designated by chemlights full > 0 
 Directives using cardinal or relative directions full < partial 
Related hypotheses concerning the number and types of commands issued by the 
SL were introduced in the context of the first emergent behavior, coordinated unit 
navigation.  Even though they pertain directly to the impact of the alternative BOI on SL 
communication, they are not repeated here. 
G. AUTONOMOUS/DECENTRALIZED MOVEMENT 
This emergent behavior describes changes in the mindset and actions of soldiers 
when they become equipped with NW.  NW provides soldiers with a COP that shows 
where they and other members of their squad and platoon are.  The digital chemlights 
enable nonverbal communication of leader intent for a variety of purposes.  A soldier 
enabled by this common sense of position and purpose is likely to feel empowered, 
relevant, and important.  Obtaining data on this mindset is beyond the scope of this 
experiment.  However, three behavioral manifestations of this mindset should be evident 
in the conduct of the C3Conflict missions.  The first is the size of individual movements 
before pausing to regroup or reassess.  We expected this move distance to be greater in 
the fully NW-enabled condition.  The second is the dispersion during movement.  
Dispersion refers to the separation of squad members.  We expected both the average and 
maximum separation to be greater when TLs were provided with NW (in the fully  
NW-enabled condition). 
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 Average distance moved in one step full > partial 
 Average dispersion of the three units while moving full > partial 
H. LEADER’S INTENT REMOTELY TRANSLATED 
The eighth emergent behavior concerns how and how quickly the SL is able to 
translate the platoon leader’s intent into directives that the TLs follow.  This translation 
involves turning the directives contained in a FRAGO into specifications of routes, 
positions, and responsibilities.  The experiment was designed to test two hypotheses 
related to the translation of leader intent.  Given the ability of NW to support a COP, we 
expected SL in the fully NW-enabled condition to make the TLs aware of any change in 
mission more quickly.  We also expected the SL in the fully NW-enabled condition to 
take advantage of the chemlights to specify routes and positions following a FRAGO: 
 Elapsed time to transmit leader intent following FRAGO full < partial 
 Use of chemlights to mark tactical positions full > 0 
I. MARKING ENEMY POSITIONS ON THE COMMON OPERATING 
PICTURE 
The final emergent behavior concerns the use of chemlights to mark enemy 
positions.  In the fully NW-enabled condition, the TLs have this ability.  In the partially 
NW-enabled condition, they do not.  Accordingly, we expected squads in the fully  
NW-enabled condition to make more use of chemlights to communicate information 
about the enemy: 
 Use of chemlights to mark enemy positions full > partial 
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IV. METHOD 
To test these hypotheses, this experiment used a computer-based, small unit war 
game to examine the effect of NW-like information on the performance of a single rifle 
squad consisting of one SL and two TLs.  The squad’s task was to conduct a series of 
three cordon and assault missions aimed at neutralizing an improvised explosive device 
(IED) cell leader in Taji, Iraq. 
A. PARTICIPANTS 
All 30 participants had leadership experience at the team level or higher and were 
assigned to the Experimental Force (EXFOR) at Fort Benning, Georgia.  All but one of 
the soldiers had returned from tours in Iraq or Afghanistan or both.  Table 1 summarizes 
their self-report demographic data across experimental conditions (fully- or partially-NW 
enabled).  Inspection of Table 1 supports the inference that the participants are 
representative of the population to which the experiment seeks to generalize.  Further, 
there appears to have been no systematic bias across experimental conditions. 
Table 1. Demographic characteristics of the soldiers who participated in  
the experiment. 
Age and Service  Tours in Iraq/Afghanistan 
Age (yrs) Full Partial  N Tours N Participants 
Mean 26.9 26.9   Full Partial 
Max 41 36  0 1 1 
Min 21 21  1 8 5 
   2 6 4 
Yrs Service Full Partial  3 0 4 
Mean 6.2 6.3  4 0 0 
Max 16 12  5 0 0 
Min 2 3  6 0 1 
    
 N Participants  N Months 
Rank Full Partial  Full Partial 
SFC 1 1  Mean 17 24 
SSG 4 2  Max 27 55 
SGT 5 6  Min 0 0 
SPC 5 6   
B. PLATFORM 
The C3Conflict experimental platform was used to simulate the information and 
communications supported by the NW system.  C3Conflict is a “microworld”—a 
distributed, computer-based simulated environment that realistically captures much of the 
complex, opaque, and dynamic nature of real-world problems (Brehmer, 2005; Brehmer 
 & Dörner, 1993; Granlund, 2003).  C3Conflict is an update of the C3Fire platform that 
has been used in the Human System Integration Laboratory (HSIL) at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) for several years (Colebank, 2008; Hernandez, Ray, 
Papadapoulas, & Glaser, 2010; Thomas, 2005).  C3Fire has been used extensively in 
research on distributed decision making and networked-based C2 (Johansson, Persson, 
Granlund, & Mattsson, 2003; Rigas, Carling, & Brehmer, 2002).  Doctor Smith, the 
principal investigator in this project and author of this report, has extensive experience 
conducting experiments using the C3Conflict suite of microworlds (Lindgren & Smith, 
2006a, 2006b; Lindgren, Smith, & Granlund, 2007; Smith, 2008; Smith, Lindgren, & 
Granlund, 2006, 2010). 
For this experiment, C3Conflict presented participants with an aerial image of the 
area of operations—the village of Taji, Iraq and the surrounding date groves (Figure 1).  
A grid of cells divided the image into square cells five meters on a side.  The 50-meter 
gridlines shown in Figure 1 contain 100 (10x10) cells.  During the experiment, an icon on 
the image indicated the participant’s location.  Other icons indicated the locations of 
other participants and, when visible, hostile forces.  By pointing-and-clicking, 
participants were able to move their icons on the image.  As shown in Table 2, the rate of 
movement depended upon the terrain.  Movement down the main road was faster than in 
the alleys between buildings and in the date groves.  Movement was slow inside a 




Figure 1.   Aerial photo covering the area of operations during the experiment 
annotated with C3Conflict gridlines. 
10 
 Table 2. Velocity of travel as a function of terrain. 
Terrain Sec per Cell kph 
Within buildings 45 0.40 
In groves 12 1.50 
Between buildings 3 6.00 
On the main road 2 9.00 
C. EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 
There were two experimental conditions.  One simulated the fully NW-enabled 
BOI and the other the partially NW-enabled BOI.  The contrast can be seen by comparing 
Figures 2 and 3.  Figure 2 is a screen-capture of the C3Conflict interface seen by  
Alpha Team during a fully NW-enabled mission (second mission - northwest cordon, 
Tuesday morning, file 44).  In this mission, the squad is represented by three red icons.  
The squad has just arrived at its objective and established the northwest cordon.  Figure 3 
is the corresponding screen-capture (the interface seen by Alpha Team at its cordon 
position) during a partially NW-enabled condition (second mission, Tuesday afternoon, 
file 50).  There are two differences across the experimental conditions, the scope of the 
map and the ability to see and deploy digital chemlights.  These are discussed in turn. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Screen-capture of the C3Conflict interface for TL Alpha in a fully  
NW-enabled mission. 
In the fully NW-enabled “Team Leader BOI,” C3Conflict presented all three 
soldiers—the SL and the two TLs—with the interface shown in Figure 2.  The interface 
contains 200m x 200m of an aerial photo of the area surrounding the objective.  Grid 
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 coordinates appear above and on the left side of the image.  In the fully NW-enabled 
condition, the entire map can be explored by moving the horizontal and vertical 
scrollbars.  The icons on the image represent the locations of (1) the soldier—the red icon 
with the letter A for Alpha Team, (2) the two other members of the squad—the red icon 
with the X for the SL and the red icon with the letter B for Bravo Team, (3) other squads 
in the platoon—white and blue icons, and (4) the platoon leader—the red icon with the X 
and three dots.  In sum, in the fully NW-enabled condition, all three members of the 




Figure 3.   Screen-capture of the C3Conflict interface for TL Alpha in a partially 
NW-enabled mission. 
In contrast, in the partially NW-enabled “Squad Leader BOI,” the interface for the 
two TLs simulated the limitations of line-of-sight vision.  A typical example is shown in 
Figure 3.  The image area is largely white.  A small zone within the image area  
(100m x 100m) offers a window to the aerial image.  The visible zone is centered on the 
soldier’s position and represents the soldier’s limited visual range.  Using the scrollbars 
does not reveal more of the image.  There are no grid coordinates around the image.  
Icons on the image represent the locations of soldiers who are within this restricted field 
of view.  Those who are out of sight are not shown.  Hence, in the partially NW-enabled 
condition, a TL had accurate information about the locations of only those soldiers whom 
he could be expected to see. 
In both conditions, the SL used an interface like that shown in Figure 2. 
The second difference across experimental conditions was the capacity of soldiers 
in the fully NW-enabled condition to embed and view digital chemlights on the aerial 
photo.  C3Conflict represents digital chemlights with colored dots that fit within a single 
12 
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cell on the image.  To place a chemlight on the image, a soldier in the fully NW-enabled 
condition, Figure 2, had to click on one of the dots in the Symbol Palette located in the 
top right corner of the interface and then click on the desired cell on the image.  
C3Conflict would then “paint” a chemlight on the image.  As shown in Figure 3, TL in 
the partially NW-enabled condition had no access to the symbol palette.  Nor could they 
see a chemlight painted on the image by their SL (who had the fully NW-enabled screen).  
In the fully NW-enabled condition, SL and TLs could communicate using digital 
chemlights.  In the partially NW-enabled condition, they could not. 
The white panels on the right sides of Figures 2 and 3 are the chat windows.  This 
emulation of radio communications was identical across the two experimental conditions.  
The upper window displayed received messages.  The soldiers used the lower window to 
type messages.  They used the “Send” button below the chat windows to transmit a 
message they had typed.  As shown in Figures 2 and 3, TLs had access to only one Send 
button (i.e., access to one radio frequency).  This button sent messages to the “Squad 
net.”  Members of the Squad net were the SL and the two TLs.  In contrast, the SL had 
access to two Send buttons and two nets—the Squad net and the Platoon net (e.g., two 
radio frequencies).  Members of the Platoon net were the SL and the experimenter who 
played the role of Platoon Leader (PL).  SL saw messages from both nets in the same 
window.  TLs had no access to the Platoon net. 
In both conditions, squad members were instructed not to speak and to limit all 
communication to typed messages in the chat window. 
D. PROCEDURE 
The experiment was conducted in a classroom on the second floor of the 
McKenna Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) Site at Fort Benning, Georgia.  
Two experimental sessions were conducted each day for five days, one in the morning 
and one in the afternoon.  Each session lasted approximately three hours.  No problems 
with participation or the computer network were encountered.  The study ran smoothly 
every day. 
Soldiers reported in groups of three.  The senior member assumed the role of SL.  
The other two soldiers assumed the roles of TLs reporting to the SL.  One three-man 
“squad” participated in each session for a total of 10 squads and 30 soldiers. 
After introductions had been made, the soldiers sat at their assigned workstations.  
Tables were arranged in a “U” with chairs on the outside.  The experimenters sat at three 
workstations at the bottom of the U.  The SL sat at a workstation on the right side of the 
U.  The two TLs sat at workstations on the left side of the U.  All participants could make 
eye contact, but were instructed not to talk during the experimental sessions.  The SL 
could gesture to summon the TLs to huddle, but was instructed to do so if and only if the 
icons representing the TLs were both in cells adjacent to his own.  This constraint was 
designed to enforce physical proximity prior to calling a huddle. 
1. Informed Consent and Demographic Questionnaire 
Once the soldiers were seated, the experimenter read a welcome statement that 
sketched the purpose of the study and told them that they could ask questions at any time 
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prior to the actual experimental sessions.  The experimenter then asked the soldiers to 
read and sign an Informed Consent Form.  The welcome script is attached as Appendix 1.  
The consent form, Appendix 2, was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
After they had all signed the consent form, they were asked to fill out a short 
demographic questionnaire.  The form is attached as Appendix 3 and is the basis for the 
information summarized in Table 1. 
2. Training Scenario 
Because participants were not familiar with C3Conflict, they received a thorough 
introduction to its interface and controls during a scripted training scenario.  The training 
script is attached as Appendix 4. 
The training session was a brief mission during which the experimenter provided 
oral instructions on the C3Conflict interface, on maneuvering a unit on the map, and on 
using the chat window to communicate.  Soldiers with the fully NW-enabled interface 
received additional instruction on the use of digital chemlights. 
The training session was self-paced.  It lasted as long as necessary for all 
members of the squad to move their units accurately and with confidence, to use the chat 
window to communicate, and to report they were comfortable with the C3Conflict 
interface.  All 10 squads completed the introductions, forms, and training session within 
an hour.  They then took a short break. 
3. Tactical Brief 
COL James Riley, USA (Ret.), a career infantry officer with extensive experience 
in Iraq, wrote the tactical scenarios used in the experiment.  The squad received a 
scenario brief after completing the practice scenario.  The brief is attached as Appendix 5. 
The brief provides the background story and operating orders for all three 
components of the cordon and search mission that the squad was to conduct in the 
experimental scenarios.  The background explains that the squad is part of a battalion 
headquartered near Taji, Iraq during the height of insurgent activities.  An active IED cell 
has been operating with virtual impunity in the vicinity.  Intelligence has identified a safe 
house where the IED cell leader is thought to be.  Their platoon has received the cordon 
and assault mission to kill or capture the IED cell leader.  The platoon is to execute a 
cordon and search conducted in three phases:  approach, establishment of the cordon, and 
assault/search. 
All three members of the squad then received two aerial photos covering the area 
of the cordon and search mission (Figures 1 and 4).  Figure 1 is annotated with lines 
representing every 10th grid coordinate shown by C3Conflict around the edge of the map 
in the fully NW-enabled condition (Figure 2).  Figure 4 is annotated with the three 
components of the mission:  a cordon to the northwest to be established by the First (Red) 
Squad, a central assault on the objective (the safe house at grid coordinate 40 38) to be 
conducted by the Third (Blue) Squad, and a cordon to the northeast to be established by 
the Second (White) Squad.  The three experimental scenarios corresponded to the three 
components of the mission sketched in Figure 4. 
  
Figure 4.   Aerial photo with annotations showing the three components of the search 
and cordon mission.  The red triangle marks the operational objective. 
4. Experimental Scenarios 
All three components of the mission were conducted in all three experimental 
scenarios.  In the first scenario, the soldiers assumed the role of the Third (Blue) Squad to 
conduct the assault along Axis Dog (Figure 4).  The experimenters assumed the roles of 
the two squads that established the cordon positions.  In the second scenario, the soldiers 
formed the First (Red) Squad and established the northwest cordon.  The experimenters 
conducted the assault and the other cordon operation.  In the third scenario, the soldiers 
were the Second (White) Squad.  They established the northeast cordon, while the 
experimenters conducted the assault and established the other cordon. 
The squad encountered no unexpected activity during the first scenario when it 
conducted the assault.  This scenario was the least complex of the three.  It served to 
build their confidence with the C3Conflict interface and each other and to demonstrate 
that the mission could be accomplished.  The script for the first scenario is attached as 
Appendix 6. 
In the second scenario, the squad moved around the village to establish a cordon 
to the northwest of the objective.  Once there, they received intelligence that the IED 
leader had moved to a second location within the village (grid coordinate 65 47).  Their 
new orders were to adjust their tactical position to establish a new cordon just west of the 
main road (grid coordinate 54 52).  This scenario was designed to elicit command and 
control actions relevant to the hypothesis that NW facilitates the emplacement and 
adjustment of tactical positions.  Its script is attached as Appendix 7. 
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The third scenario was designed to elicit command and control actions relevant to 
the hypothesis that NW facilitates the reinforcement of an engaged unit.  Its script is 
attached as Appendix 8.  In this scenario, the squad moved to the northeast around the 
village to establish a cordon near the main road.  Shortly after the assault began, they 
received intelligence that the Blue Squad had come under heavy fire, was pinned down, 
had taken casualties, and needed reinforcement.  Their new orders were to reinforce the 
engaged unit and conduct the assault on the objective.  Of the three scenarios, this was 
the most complex and had the greatest risk of casualties. 
Each of the 10 squads engaged all three scenarios in the sequence described.  The 
difficulty presented by the scenarios progressed from simplest to most complex.  The 
order of scenarios was not randomized in order to maximize the potential to observe any 
practice or learning effects that might emerge.  Given the novelty of the C3Conflict 
interface and its simulation of NW, we expected to observe behaviors indicative of 
increasing familiarity with the system. 
E. MEASURES 
C3Conflict captured three types of data that can be used to analyze C2 processes 
and how they are mediated by NW. 
1. Position as a Function of Time 
C3Conflict records the position of every unit whenever that position changes.  
These data are time-stamped and recorded using the grid coordinates shown in Figures 1 
and 3.  The log of these positions and times is amenable to quantitative analysis. 
2. Commands 
C3Conflict records and time-stamps every action taken by a soldier including, but 
not limited to, moving a unit, placing a digital chemlight on the aerial photo, and sending 
a chat message.  The log of these actions is amenable to quantitative analysis. 
3. Chat-Based Communications 
C3Conflict creates a transcript of all chat communications.  The transcript is 
called a ‘protocol’.  It facilitates both qualitative and quantitative analysis of the content 
of directives and other communications.  The method for these analyses is called 
“protocol analysis.” 
F. PROTOCOL ANALYSIS 
The first step in any protocol analysis is to develop a scheme that can be used to 
assign each statement to a unique and descriptive category.  The categories in the scoring 
scheme should be designed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive.  The scoring scheme 
shown in Tables 3, 4, and 5 was developed for this project to analyze the content of the 
soldiers’ chat communications.  The high-level categories in the scheme, shown in  
Table 3, were based upon previous work by Doctors Larry and Nita Shattuck of the 
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Operations Research Department at NPS and by the author (Smith, 2008; Smith, 
Lindgren, & Granlund, 2006).  The subcategories shown in Tables 4 and 5 were added to 
provide greater detail and to extract data to test several of the hypotheses. 
Table 3. Top-level categories used to score the protocol of the soldiers’ text-based 
“chat” communications. 
Acronym Category and Description 
L Pull.  Requests for information from another player or the direct reply to a request. 
H Push.  Provision of information that was not recently requested by the recipient. 
Frequently a Situation Report (SITREP). 
A Acknowledgement.  An utterance that provides an indication that the speaker has 
understood an utterance. 
D Directive.  Issued by SL to TLs. 
S Script.  Any and all communications by the PL or other squads. 
C Coordination.  An utterance by a TL that is intended to facilitate squad navigation 
or synchronization. 
RC Radio Check.  An utterance that requests or responds to a radio check. 
EH Clarification sought.  An utterance that seeks explanation of something that was 
unclear. 
EX Clarification provided.  An utterance that provides explanation of something that 
was previously unclear. 
BS BS.  Puerile speech that may or may not promote squad cohesion. 
PF Positive feedback.  Statements promoting squad cohesion. 
EXP Statements about the Experiment or Interface. 
# Carriage return without text. 
 
The scoring scheme was applied iteratively to the protocol from all 30 missions.  
There were 2,853 chat messages in total.  The first pass through the protocol applied a 
preliminary set of categories (pull, push, acknowledgment, directive, script, coordination, 
other) and uncovered the need for the additional categories listed in Table 3.  Subsequent 
passes assigned one of the categories in Table 3 to each message.  During this process, it 
became clear that the SLs were requesting several different types of information from the 
TLs and that the TLs (and SLs) were providing these and other types of information to 
the SL (and PL) without being prompted.  This finding motivated the development of the 
subcategories for pulls and pushes in Table 4.  A similar process of discovery motivated 
the development of the subcategories for SL directives to TLs shown in Table 5. 
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Table 4. Subcategories for Pulls, Pushes, and Scripts used to score the protocol of 
the soldier’s chat. 
Pulls Requests for information from another player or the direct reply to a request 
LD Pull Down.  Request by the SL to a TL or by the PL to the SL.  A Pull Down is 
normally followed by a Pull Response or Pull Response SITREP. 
LU Pull Up.  Request by a TL to the SL or by the SL to the PL. 
LR Pull Response.  Information that is not a SITREP in response to a Pull. 
LS Pull Response SITREP.  Information provided by a TL (SL) in response to a pull from 
the SL (PL) requesting a SITREP. 
  
Pushes Provision of information that was not recently requested by the recipient 
HC Push/Contact.  Information about contact with a hostile or a hostile’s position. 
HI Push/In Position.  Information about being set at an intended location. 
HM Push/Movement.  Information about ongoing movement. 
HS Push/SITREP.  Information about personnel, ammunition, and medical condition. 
HW Push/Where.  Information about location. 
HO Push/Other.  Information about an action other than a player’s ongoing movement, 
location, contact, or SITREP. 
HSD Push Scripted Directive.  SL copies or paraphrases PL directive to the squad net. 
  
Scripts Any and all communications by the PL or other squads 
SD Scripted Directive.  An order or command from the PL that is part of the mission script.
SS Scripted Statement.  Information provided by the PL or another SL as part of the 
mission script. 
Table 5. Subcategories for Directives used to score the protocol of the  
soldier’s chat. 
Directives Issued by SL to TL 
DD Direction.  A command that makes explicit reference to a cardinal direction 
(“Move north.”) or a relative direction (“B team move to my left flank.”). 
DF Follow.  A command to follow a specific unit (“Follow me.”) or, the fully 
NW-enabled condition, a trail of chemlights (“Follow the yellow chems.”). 
DH Hold.  A command to stand by. 
DL Lead.  A command to take the lead. 
DM Move.  A command to move out or encouragement to move faster. 
DP Plan.  A statement of squad-level tactics.  (“When we get to that building to 
the right, let’s skirt it to our position.”) 
DR Return.  A command to join the SL at his location, generally in order to 
huddle. 
DW Where.  A command that explicitly refers to a specific location, building, or 
road.  (“At blocking point A take yellow B take green.”) 
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The complete scoring scheme makes it possible to analyze what was said in 
addition to how often it was said.  Counts of the scoring categories are measures of 
content.  By analyzing the content of the soldiers’ chat it becomes possible to identify 
whether and how the simulation of the alternative BOI influenced the communication 
used in the exercise of C2.  The focus of the analyses presented here was largely on SLs, 
as they were responsible for translating the (scripted) PL’s intent into efficient and 
effective operations. 
The scoring scheme was applied iteratively to the protocol from all 30 missions.  
There were 2,853 chat messages in total.  The first pass through the protocol applied a 
preliminary set of categories (pull, push, acknowledgment, directive, script, coordination, 
other) and uncovered the need for the additional categories listed in Table 3.  Subsequent 
passes assigned one of the categories in Table 3 to each message.  During this process, it 
became clear that the SLs were requesting several different types of information from the 
TLs and that the TLs (and SLs) were providing these and other types of information to 
the SL (and PL) without being prompted.  This finding motivated the development of the 
subcategories for pulls and pushes in Table 4.  A similar process of discovery motivated 
the development of the subcategories for SL directives to TLs shown in Table 5. 
The complete scoring scheme makes it possible to analyze what was said in 
addition to how often it was said.  Counts of the scoring categories are measures of 
content.  By analyzing the content of the soldiers’ chat it becomes possible to identify 
whether and how the simulation of the alternative BOI influenced the communication 
used in the exercise of C2.  The focus of the analyses presented here was largely on SLs, 
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V. RESULTS 
The discussion of results follows the sequence of hypotheses.  Table 6 lists the 
hypotheses and indicates whether or not they were supported by the data.  Both 
parametric and nonparametric tests were used to ascertain the level of statistical 
significance of observed differences across experimental conditions. 
Table 6, part 1. Hypotheses and results of statistical tests.  All hypotheses are  








    
 N huddles Yes .02 5 
 N commands to change course Yes .03 6 
 N commands of all kinds during 
maneuver 
No 1.0  
Emplace and 
adjust 
    
 Time to reach cordon position Yes .08 7 
 Time to move after FRAGO No .85  
 N commands to correct positioning No .35  
Conduct 
precise ops 
    
 Average separation of TL lines from SL 
line 
Yes .0003 8 
 Maximum separation of TL lines from 
SL line 
Yes .002 9 
 Extra distance traveled No .23  
Reinforce 
engaged unit 
    
 Time to move after FRAGO No .85  
 Time to reach assault position No .21  
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Table 6, part 2. Hypotheses and results of statistical tests.  All hypotheses are  








    
 N messages from SL to PL  NA .56 10 
 N messages from SL to TL NA .0006 11 
 Directives using directions Yes .0008 12 
 Directives to follow chemlights, Full > 0 Yes .0076 12, 13 
Autonomy     
 Average distance moved in one step Yes .03,  14 
 Average dispersion of the squad while 
moving, Full > Partial 





    
 Relaying change in mission Yes .03 15 
 Use of chemlights to mark tactical 
positions, Full > 0 
Yes NA 13 
Marking the 
enemy 
    
 Use of chemlights to mark enemy 
positions, Full > 0 
No NA  
Note:  NA – not applicable 
A. COORDINATED UNIT NAVIGATION 
Two of the three hypotheses concerning coordinated unit navigation were 
supported.  As expected, there were fewer planning huddles (Figure 5) and changes in 
course during a maneuver (Figure 6) in the fully NW-enabled condition than in the 
partially NE-enabled condition.  In these figures and others like them, the vertical axis 
shows the counts of the independent variable, e.g., calls by the SL for a huddle.  The first 
three categories on the horizontal axis correspond to the three missions.  They are shown 
in the sequence in which they were conducted.  The final category contrasts the two BOI 














Figure 5.   Graph showing the average number of directives to huddle. 















Figure 6.   Graph showing the average number of commands to change course during 
a maneuver. 
Both ANOVA achieve significance with impressive levels of power considering 
the small numbers of observations:  F(1,8) = 9.93, MSE = 4.8, p < .02, power = .35 for 
huddles and F(1,8) = 7.46, MSE = 93.6, p = .03, power = .36 for commands to change 
course.  The strength of both results supports the argument that distributing NW to TLs 
changes how SLs approach the C2 task of directing maneuvers. 
The third hypothesis, that there would be fewer total commands during a 
maneuver in the fully NW-enabled condition, was not supported.  The totals were 
identical across conditions.  Thus, the SL communicated just as often in the two 
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 conditions, but in a different manner (Figures 5 and 6).  Additional findings that shed 
light on the difference in SL to TL communication across the BOI are discussed in the 
section on Communication during Movement, below. 
B. EMPLACEMENT AND ADJUSTMENT OF TACTICAL POSITIONS 
Three hypotheses concern emplacement and adjustment.  All three were tested 
using data from the second and third missions.  In the second mission, the squad 
established the northwest cordon position and then received a FRAGO to move to the 
east to establish a new cordon position.  In the third mission, the squad established the 
northeast cordon position and then received a FRAGO to move south down the main road 
to reinforce the assault squad that was taking fire. 
The measure used to test the hypothesis about emplacement was the time between 
(1) when the PL issued the directive to move out from the dismount location and (2) 
when the squad was set at its initial cordon position.  This measure supported the 
hypothesis.  The average times to reach the positions are shown in Figure 7.  The 
differences are in the expected direction, but do not reach the standard .05 level of 
statistical significance, F(1,8) = 3.98, MSE = 58104., p = .08, power = .20.  With a larger 
data set, it is highly likely that this measure would become statistically significant.  
Pragmatically, this result supports the hypothesis. 


















Figure 7.   Graph showing the average time in seconds to reach, establish, and 
announce set at the initial cordon position. 
The second measure was the time to adjust positions following the FRAGO to do 
so.  This measure did not support the hypothesis.  The squads did not have far to go and 
they always hustled. 
The difference in these results may reflect a combination of factors.  The first is 
the degree of stealth required.  Moving quietly prior to the assault on the safe house was a 
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major concern when establishing the initial cordon positions.  This was not a concern 
after the original mission had been compromised.  The second is the difference in the 
distances and relative directness of the routes to be taken.  The routes from the dismount 
point to the initial cordon positions involved moving around the village.  In contrast, the 
routes following the FRAGOs were short and travel was relatively fast. 
The third hypothesis relevant to emplacing and adjusting positions concerned the 
number of commands issued by the SL to reposition the TL upon arrival at the assault or 
cordon position.  There was no difference across the experimental conditions.  This null 
result is consistent with the interpretation that soldiers do not need the capabilities offered 
by NW to execute well-drilled activities in close quarters. 
In sum, the fully NW-enabled condition may enhance a squad’s ability to move 
quickly and stealthily.  It does not appear to have an effect on either the SL’s need to 
reposition TLs upon arrival or on the squad’s movement directly down a main road when 
a mission has been compromised. 
C. CONDUCT PRECISE OPERATIONS 
Three measures were analyzed to test hypotheses about the precision of  
squad-level operations.  Two of the measures reflect the assumption that the precision of 
movement is best when TLs take the same line as their SL.  Thus, precision varies 
inversely with the difference between (1) the line taken by TLs while moving from the 
dismount point to the initial cordon or assault position and (2) the line taken by their SL.  
It is worth noting that these operations require stealth. 
Figure 8 is a graph of the average distance between lines taken by TLs and their 
SL.  Figure 9 shows the maximum separation during this move.  We predicted that both 
measures would be less in the fully NW-enabled condition.  Both hypotheses were 
confirmed.  The average separation was highly significant, F(1,8) = 20.39, MSE = 2.46,  
p = .0003, power = .64.  The maximum separation was also significant, F(1,8) = 13.06, 
MSE = 19.19, p = .002, power = .49.  The strength of these two results supports the 
argument that a rifle squad’s ability to conduct precise operations while moving stealthily 
is greatly enhanced by the fully NW-enabled BOI. 
















Figure 8.   Graph showing the average separation between the lines taken by TLs and 
the line taken by their SL.  The unit of measurement is a C3Conflict cell, a square 
















Figure 9.   Graph showing the maximum separation between the lines taken by TLs 
and the line taken by their SL.  The unit of measurement is a C3Conflict cell, a 
square nominally five meters on a side. 
The final hypothesis for this emergent behavior was that the difference in the 
lengths of the routes taken by TL and the route taken by their SL would be less in the 
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 fully NW-enabled condition.  The unit of measurement was the number of C3Conflict 
cells.  This hypothesis was not supported.  The differences were in the anticipated 
direction for all three missions, but the variability across individual TL was equally large.  
This is the first of two measures to be reported for which individual differences were as 
large as any effect that could be associated with NW. 
D. REINFORCEMENT OF AN ENGAGED UNIT 
We tested two hypotheses associated with the reinforcement of an engaged unit, 
the time to move out following a FRAGO and the time taken to reach the support by fire 
position.  Neither hypothesis was supported.  While both were in the anticipated 
direction, the likelihood of these measures reaching statistical significance is slim. 
This finding may be an artifact of the scenario used in this experiment to evaluate 
this hypothesis.  The route to be taken following the FRAGO was short.  Travel was in a 
straight line down a major road and, accordingly, relatively fast.  There was no need for 
stealth.  In retrospect, this scenario did not require the SL to take full advantage of NW.  
In future studies it would be possible to improve the design of the scenario to improve the 
opportunity to observe differences across conditions. 
E. COMMUNICATION DURING MOVEMENT 
The discussion in this section covers a range of topics relevant to squad 
communications that emerged during the protocol analysis in addition to the two 
hypotheses concerning communication during movement. 
Approximately 10% of the chat messages were sent from the SL to the PL (286 of 
2,853).  Figure 10 shows the distribution of those messages across all categories of SL to 
PL chat.  These categories and their acronyms are listed in Tables 2 and 3.  Even though 
the distributions are similar and not significantly different, chi-square (7) = 5.84, p > .55, 
inspection of Figure 10 reveals that SL in the fully NW-enabled condition pushed more 
messages to the PL than SL in the partially NW-enabled condition.  Specifically, they 
pushed more information about contact with the enemy and the squad’s position and 
movement status.  These data are consistent with the argument that the fully NW-enabled 
BOI makes it possible for the SL to take the time to push more battlefield-relevant 
information up the chain of command. 












Figure 10.   Graph showing the distribution of the total counts of chat communications 
from the SL to the PL in the 30 missions. 
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 Of the 657 messages from SL to TL, 424 were directives:  mission-relevant 
commands.  Figure 11 shows the distribution of directives across the categories listed in 
Table 5.  A chi-square test found the distributions to be significantly different, chi-square 
(7) = 25.6, p < .0006.  While the distributions may appear to be the same, they are not.  
Two categories, commands that made explicit references to cardinal or relative directions 
(DD) and commands to follow (DF), vary in opposite directions and contribute 
prominently to the chi-square calculation.  SLs in the fully NW-enabled condition gave 
fewer than half as many directional commands as SLs in the partially NW-enabled 
condition.  Instead, they issued commands that efficiently and accurately referred to 
common operational graphics, e.g., “Follow the yellow chems.” 












Figure 11.   Graph showing the distribution of the total counts of chat communications 
from the SL to TLs in the 30 missions. 
The two sets of commands issued to guide squad movement are highlighted in 
Figure 12.  As predicted, both differences are highly significant, chi-square (1) = 11.34,  
p = .0008 for commands using cardinal or relative directions and chi-square (1) = 7.12,  
p = .0076 for commands to follow.  These results are consistent with the argument that 
the fully NW-enabled BOI fundamentally changes how SL approach the C2 task of 
directing their squads to maneuver.  They spend much less time and effort telling TLs 
precisely where and how to move.  Instead, they post chemlights on the shared map and 
tell TLs to follow the path. 
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Figure 12.   Graph showing the number of directives that specified moving in a 
cardinal or relative direction or that specified following the SL or chemlight trail. 
Four typical examples of chemlight use by SLs in the fully NW-enabled condition 
are shown in Figure 13.  The panel in the upper left shows how one of the SL used 
chemlights to direct the assault on the objective in the first mission.  The two panels on 
the right show how two different SL in different missions used chemlights to show TLs 
the routes to take to their cordon positions in the second and third missions.  The panel in 
the lower left shows how an SL directed TLs to the second cordon following the FRAGO 
to adjust position in the second mission.  In all four cases, the SL used the capabilities of 








Figure 13.   Four examples of chemlight use by SLs in the fully NW-enabled 
condition.  (a) An assault on the objective.  (b) Approaching the northwest cordon 
position.  (c) Adjusting that position.  (d) Approaching the northeast  
cordon position. 
F. AUTONOMOUS/DECENTRALIZED MOVEMENT 
To test the hypothesis about the enhancement of TL autonomy in the fully  
NW-enabled condition, we measured the distances that TLs moved their icons on the 
C3Conflict map.  The unit of measurement was the C3Conflict cell.  The minimum 
distance that an icon can be moved is one cell.  A diagonal move (e.g., to the northeast) 
has a distance of 1.4 (root 2) cells. 
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When comparing across experimental conditions, it is important to remember the 
constraints imposed by the two displays, Figures 1 and 2.  TLs in the fully NW-enabled 
 condition could see a 40x40 area of cells, Figure 1.  The maximum distance they could 
move their unit was to the edge of the map.  If the map was centered on the TL’s current 
location, this distance could be as great as 28 (20 root 2) cells.  In contrast, TLs in the 
partially NW-enabled condition could see only a 20x20 area of cells that was always 
centered on their current position (Figure 2).  To remain within visible range, the greatest 
distance the TL could move was 14 (10 root 2) cells. 
Figure 14 is a graph of the average distance that TLs moved their icons on the 
map during the move from the dismount point to the initial assault or cordon position.  
These are the operations that required stealth.  The differences across BOI are highly 
significant and are evident in every mission, F(1,8) = 5.81, MSE = 24.84, p = .03, power 
= .52.  This result strongly supports the claim that a soldier in the fully NW-enabled BOI 
is likely to feel sufficiently informed and empowered to move further before pausing to 















Figure 14.   Graph showing the average number of C3Conflict cells that TLs moved 
their units on the map. 
The inference about soldier empowerment is indirectly supported by the 
significant and systematic increase in the average distance moved across the three 
missions in the fully NW-enabled condition.  As shown in Figure 14, TLs moved with 
increasingly larger steps as they became more familiar with the emulation of NW.  In 
contrast, TLs without NW did not change how they moved. 
To test the hypothesis about the dispersion of the squad while moving, we looked 
at four measures:  (1) the distance between the outermost two members of the squad in 
the direction perpendicular to the squad’s line of travel; (2) the “tip to tail” distance 
between the lead member and the trailing member of the squad in the direction of the line 
of travel; (3) the distance between the two TLs independent of orientation; and (4) the 
total of the three distances between the three members of the squad.  None was 
significantly different.  All four measures are dominated by variability across squads.  
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 This is the second of the two measures that individual differences appear to have made 
relatively insensitive to any impact that NW might have on squad operations. 
G. LEADER’S INTENT REMOTELY TRANSLATED 
During both the second and third missions, the SL received a FRAGO from the 
PL (an experimenter) to move the squad from its initial cordon position.  The transcripts 
of the chat messages reveal the elapsed time between when the SL received the FRAGO 
(on the platoon net) and when he passed it along to the TL (on the squad net).  As shown 
in Figure 15, this time was significantly quicker in the fully NW-enabled condition, 
F(1,8) = 7.20, MSE = 24221., p = .03, power = .28. 
















Figure 15.   Graph showing the average time in seconds for a SL to transmit or 
translate or both a FRAGO from the PL to the TL. 
Many SLs in the fully NW-enabled condition used the copy and paste functions of 
the chat window to expedite the transfer of information.  They copied the FRAGO from 
the platoon net and pasted it to the squad net and sent it to the TL.  This action gave TLs 
the chance to read and digest the FRAGO for themselves.  This exercise of empowerment 
never happened in the partially NW-enabled condition.  This difference may reflect a 
tacit acknowledgment by many SLs that fully NW-enabled TLs possess a sufficiently 
accurate COP to contribute meaningfully to the squad’s response to a FRAGO. 
The second hypothesis concerning leader’s intent proposed that SLs in the fully 
NW-enabled condition would use chemlights to mark tactical positions.  The hypothesis 
was supported.  Two examples are shown in the lower panels of Figure 13.  In the panel 
on the lower left, the SL posted two green chemlights and let his TL choose between 
them.  In the panel on the lower right, the SL directed Alpha Team to the yellow 
chemlight and Bravo Team to the green chemlight.  These examples show SLs taking full 
advantage of this capability of NW and tailoring its use to fit their styles of command.  
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As this type of communication was not possible in the partially NW-enabled condition, 
no statistical test can be conducted. 
H. MARKING ENEMY POSITIONS ON THE COMMON OPERATING 
PICTURE 
The one hypothesis about using chemlights to mark enemy position was not 
supported.  This null result reveals more about the conduct of the experiment than it does 
about the contrast in BOI.  The experimenter playing the role of PL placed chemlights on 
suspected enemy positions at the beginning of every mission.  Whenever the soldiers 
came within visual range of an insurgent (i.e., entered the objective house), the 
experimenter playing the role of the insurgents placed a symbol on the map revealing the 
presence of an enemy.  This symbol immediately drew fire from the soldiers.  As soon as 
the soldiers killed the enemy, the experimenter changed the symbol to mark the kill.  As a 
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VI. DISCUSSION 
In this section, we recapitulate the experimental findings by presenting analyses 
of their implications for the BOI decision. 
There are two clusters of results that support the fully NW-enabled BOI.  First, 
SLs in the fully NW-enabled condition communicated more effectively.  Second, squads 
in the fully NW-enabled condition moved more efficiently when stealth was required.  
These two direct benefits are interpreted to manifest themselves as a reduction in SL 
workload and in enhanced TL autonomy, empowerment, and responsibility.  These direct 
and indirect benefits are discussed in turn.  The section ends with a summary of the 
limitations of the experiment and the experimental platform. 
A. THE FULLY NW-ENABLED BOI IMPROVES THE FLOW OF 
INFORMATION UP AND DOWN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND 
Six of the confirmed hypotheses relate to the flow of information and the creation 
of a common operating picture.  SLs in the fully NW-enabled condition called fewer 
huddles (Figure 5), issued fewer commands to change course (Figure 6), and issued fewer 
commands that relied on cardinal or relative directions (Figure 12).  Instead, they made 
extensive and effective use of digital chemlights (Figure 13) and of commands to follow 
them (Figures 12 and 13).  In addition, they pushed more battle-relevant information to 
PLs (Figure 10), were faster to relay FRAGO from the PL to their TLs (Figure 15), and 
used chemlights to mark tactical positions (Figure 13). 
The fully NW-enabled BOI provides the SL with more choices and greater 
flexibility in how to communicate up and down the chain of command.  The SLs who 
were able to use the digital chemlights were freed from having to call time-consuming 
huddles and from the need to fine-tune their squad’s movement.  Once they had posted 
the line to follow and the tactical positions to take on the common operating picture, the 
SLs were free to provide more information to the PL.  Their TLs knew what to do and the 
PL knew what they were doing.  In sum, the fully NW-enabled BOI makes it easier for 
SLs to do this part of their job well. 
B. MOVEMENT 
Four of the confirmed hypotheses reveal the manifold ways that the fully  
NW-enabled BOI can improve squad movement.  When stealth is required, squads 
moved faster (Figure 7), with more precision (Figures 8 and 9), and more autonomously 
(Figure 14).  The design of the experimental missions may have precluded observing 
similar benefits when the primary mission had been compromised and stealth was no 
longer a constraint on movement. 
This combination of benefits is remarkable and can likely be traced to a shared 
operating picture populated by digital chemlights that form a line to follow.  The 
common picture freed TLs to connect the dots.  They moved further with each step in 
precisely the right direction.  This, in turn, enabled the squad to move faster and, it is 
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inferred, with greater stealth.  In sum, the fully NW-enabled BOI makes it easier for TLs 
to do this part of their job well. 
C. THE FULLY NW-ENABLED BOI DECREASES SL WORKLOAD 
The experiment uncovered systematic differences across conditions and 
improvements in unit operations in the fully NW-enabled condition.  It is reasonable to 
infer that both the changes in communication and the improvements in squad movement 
would contribute to a reduction in SL workload in the fully NW-enabled BOI. 
Issuing NW to TLs allows SLs to use the digital chemlights to direct squad 
movement and to issue simple, easily understood directives such as “follow the red 
chems” (Figure 13).  This is surely less effortful, both mentally and physically, and less 
time-consuming than assembling the squad in a huddle, issuing detailed verbal 
instructions, and insuring the instructions are understood.  Issuing NW to TLs reduces the 
need for the SL to take the time and effort to fine-tune squad movement (Figures 7 and 
12).  This offloading of time-consuming and effortful tasks should reduce SL workload. 
Time pressure is one of the major sources of workload in any dynamic 
environment.  The observation that SLs, in the fully NW-enabled condition, had and took 
the time to push information up the chain of command (Figure 10), suggests that they felt 
less time pressure.  Further, it is likely that the act of pushing information further reduces 
SL workload:  it is an act that empowers others who are less likely to be in the line of fire 
to weigh options and make time-critical decisions in a thoughtful manner.  SLs who 
know that their PLs are fully informed are less likely to be debilitated by time pressure 
and workload. 
The concomitant improvements in squad performance in the fully NW-enabled 
condition are likely to act like a prescription for reduced SL workload.  The mental effort 
of leadership is surely reduced when SLs know that their TLs are likely to take the right 
path quickly and efficiently. 
Any reduction in SL workload during the execution of a mission is beneficial.  
When workload is relatively low, SLs are better able to respond to unexpected situations, 
to remain in control of the squad, to devote time and attention to planning and 
anticipating the unfolding course of the mission, and to keep the squad and superiors 
better informed. 
D. THE FULLY NW-ENABLED BOI INCREASES TL AUTONOMY, 
EMPOWERMENT, AND RESPONSIBILITY 
TLs in the fully NW-enabled condition moved faster, further, and more precisely.  
It is likely that a soldier who performs better knows that he is performing better.  The 
soldier who knows he can move stealthily will have greater confidence in himself and his 
squad.  This knowledge, if sustained and reinforced, would likely manifest itself as a 
sense of autonomy, empowerment, and responsibility.  It would also promote team 
cohesion.  Finally, and perhaps most critically, the self-confidence promoted by the fully 
NW-enable BOI would likely to endow TLs with the sense that they would be able to 
assume command were the need to arise. 
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E. LIMITATIONS OF THE C3CONFLICT EXPERIMENTAL PLATFORM 
1. Unit Navigation 
C3Conflict representation of leader/fire team movement and navigation provided 
continuous location and intended destination display, which also defined the individual’s 
orientation on the digital imagery.  Navigation was not explicitly represented.  Actual 
movement routes between participant designated points were automatically selected and 
executed by the computer using a straight line algorithm, which eliminated the possibility 
of deviation from the path due to inattention or inadequate location tracking by the 
participant.  Consequently, it was impossible to get lost, which is quite unrealistic. 
2. Distortion of Distances 
The experimental instructions informed the soldiers that the square cells in the 
C3Conflict map had sides five meters in length.  This length was chosen to match the 
sizes of the buildings in the aerial photo.  The speeds with which soldiers moved through 
the terrain were scaled to this 5-meter cell size, Table 2.  Accordingly, both the imagery 
and movement rates reinforced the 5x5 meter cells. 
Nevertheless, there is evidence in the soldiers’ chat that several of them vastly 
overestimated the cell size.  Here is an illustrative example:  “We just covered 2k in less 
than a minute.  That’s pretty good!”  The squad had, in fact, crossed 15 cells, 75 meters, 
in two minutes.  It is unclear how pervasive this distortion was.  If, in fact, soldiers 
routinely assumed that 15 cells were the equivalent of two kilometers (rather than 75 
meters), then the differences in distances across conditions shown in Figures 8, 9, and 14 
scale to hundreds of meters. 
3. Common Operational Picture (COP) 
C3Conflict representation of the COP was very good in terms of providing 
continuous individual leader location and individual icons for every other NW-equipped 
leader within a designated organization.  The model was limited in its ability to mimic 
fully the friendly and enemy operational graphics and symbols made available by NW.  
Participants were provided with paper copies of the area of operations imagery with base-
friendly graphics and enemy situation template depicted to mitigate this shortcoming in 
NW capability representation.  The model display provided a single scale digital image of 
the area of operations without operational graphics or situation templates.  The resolution 
of the single digital image was approximately 1:25,000, which is adequate for participant 
computer-based execution of the tactical plan, but far less than the capability provided  
by NW. 
C3Conflict also does not represent the target acquisition, identification, and 
engagement decision cycle of actual lethal fires and effects application.  Direct fire 
engagements were computer automated events, based upon proximity rules.  As such, 
leaders were not required to implement either directive or procedural controls over direct 
fire engagements.  Fratricide and any evaluation of NW-enabled awareness impacting its 
likelihood of occurrence was, therefore, not possible. 
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4. Command and Control (C2) 
C3Conflict representation of the digital chemlight capability was excellent.  
Participants made frequent and realistic use of the capability to direct the actions of  
NW-enabled subordinates and rapidly mark significant location-based information events 
on the digital display. 
The single scale digital image of the area of operations without operational 
graphics or situation templates, while adequate for computer-based execution of the 
tactical plans, probably limited the tactical sophistication of squad actions on the 
objective to some degree.  One-meter or even submeter level imagery might have 
generated additional clarity and detailed tactical arrangement of forces leading up to and 
during the assault of the target building.  Participant questions about courtyard wall 
heights, number of building stories, target building entry points, and some confusion 
whether a shape on the digital image was a building or an open area probably could have 
been answered with higher resolution imagery. 
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APPENDIX 1. WELCOME 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Welcome 
Welcome.  You are invited to participate in a research study on the (Squad Leader / Team 
Leader) Basis of Issue of the Ground Soldier System / Land Warrior (GSS/LW). 
The three of you are members of a squad that will be part of a platoon-level cordon and 
search mission in Iraq.  The focus of the study is on command and control, not on 
weapons use. 
(Rank Name)__________________________, you are the Squad Leader. 
(Rank Name)__________________________, you are the leader of Alpha Team. 
(Rank Name)__________________________, you are the leader of Bravo Team. 
You three represent the squad leadership.  Your squad will receive orders from a platoon 
leader directing you to move from a Stryker vehicle dismount point to either an assault 
position or a blocking position.  The designated assault element will then attack the target 
location to engage and eliminate an IED cell.  You will receive additional information 
about your specific mission soon. 
This study is computer-based.  The computer interface enables you to move an icon that 
represents you (for Squad Leaders) or you and your team (for Team Leaders) on a map 
by clicking and pointing.  The computers are linked so that each of you can see on the 
map all icons in the immediate vicinity (with 50 m).  GSS-enabled leaders will be able to 
see icons beyond the line of sight.  There will be other icons on the map that represent (1) 
the Platoon Leader, (2) the Squad Leaders and Team Leaders of two other squads, and (3) 
members of the IED cell. 
The computers are configured to present information in a manner that emulates the 
information that is available in the (Squad Leader / Team Leader) Basis of Issue of the 
Ground Soldier System (GSS). 
You will receive training on how to use the computer interface to move your icon, to 
communicate with each other, to receive orders from the platoon leader, and to engage 
the enemy. 
You will then participate in three sessions.  In the first session, your squad will be the 
assault element.  In the second and third sessions, your squad will be a cordon element 
assigned inner-cordon tasks. 
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APPENDIX 2. INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Consent to Participate in Research 
Introduction. 
You are invited to participate in a research study entitled Quantitative evaluation of squad 
and team leader performance with and without GSS (QUEST±GSS).  The study is being 
conducted on behalf of TRAC Monterey. 
Voluntary Nature of the Study. 
Your participation in this study is strictly voluntary. If you choose to participate you can 
change your mind at any time and withdraw from the study. You will not be penalized in 
any way or lose any benefits to which you would otherwise be entitled if you choose not 
to participate in this study or to withdraw. If you decline to participate you will return to 
your normal duties. 
Potential Risks and Discomforts. 
There are no foreseeable risks of participating in the study. You will be asked to sit at a 
computer terminal for 3 sessions each lasting approximately 30 minutes. Between 
computer sessions you will be free to stretch and have coffee, etc. 
Anticipated Benefits. 
Anticipated benefits from this study are data that will inform the decision of how to 
distribute the ground soldier system (GSS) to squads. The GSS is expected to improve 
command and control and squad performance. You will not directly benefit from your 
participation in this research. 
Compensation for Participation. 
No tangible compensation will be given. A copy of the research results will be available 
at the conclusion of the experiment from TRAC Monterey. 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act. 
Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept confidential to the full 
extent permitted by law. All efforts, within reason, will be made to keep your personal 
information in your research record confidential but total confidentiality cannot be 
guaranteed. 
We are not collecting any information about you personally other than your rank and role 
in your squad (e.g., squad leader, team leader, rifleman). We do not record your name or 
any other identifiers. The computer you will use has a number. The data that will be 
stored refers to the computer number, not to you. 
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However, it is possible that the researcher may be required to divulge information 
obtained in the course of this research to your chain of command or other legal body. 
Points of Contact. 
If you have any questions or comments about the research, or you experience an injury or 
have questions about any discomforts that you experience while taking part in this study 
please contact the Principal Investigator, Dr. Kip Smith, cssmit1@nps.edu. Questions 
about your rights as a research subject or any other concerns may be addressed to the 
Navy Postgraduate School IRB Chair, Dr. Lawrence Shattuck, lgshattu@nps.edu, 831-
656-2473. 
Statement of Consent. 
I have read the information provided above. I have been given the opportunity to ask 
questions and all the questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have been 
provided a copy of this form for my records and I agree to participate in this study. I 
understand that by agreeing to participate in this research and signing this form, I do not 
waive any of my legal rights. 
 
 
………………………………………                        …………………… 
Participant’s Signature  Date 
 
 
………………………………………                        …………………… 
Researcher’s Signature  Date 
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APPENDIX 3. DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
QUEST±GSS 
Demographic Information 
This form has two sides 




Have you served as a Platoon Leader?        Y            N 
 
Have you served as a Squad Leader?        Y            N 
 
Have you served as a Team Leader?        Y            N 
 




Years of Service __________ 
 
Have you deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan since April 2003?        Y            N 
How many deployments? __________ 
How many months total? __________ 
How many times did you conduct a patrol on foot?__________ 
How many times did you conduct a vehicle-mounted patrol?__________ 
 
Do you play video games?__________ 
How many hours a week?__________ 
 
How many emails do you send in an average day?__________ 
 
How many text message do you send in an average day?__________ 
Experience with the Ground Soldier System / Land Warrior (GSS/LW) 
Have you used the GSS/LW in theater?        Y            N 
 
Have you participated in a study of the GSS/LW?        Y            N 
 
Are you familiar with the GSS/LW?        Y            N 
 
If you answered Yes to one or more of the last three questions, please describe 
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APPENDIX 4. TRAINING SCRIPT 
TRAINING MISSION 
Set up 
TrainingForSLboi.con  or TrainingForTLboi.con 
NotTaji.sce 
TNG Area 2.gif 
 
5 computers: 
 1 Manager & PL 
 2 Insurgents 
 3 Red Squad Leader 
 4 Alpha Team Red Squad 
 5 Bravo Team Red Squad 
 
Start manager, Select PL and Insurgents 
 
Participant selects his roles and see his icon 
Please double click on the C3Conflict icon in the upper right corner of the screen. 
Click Run 
Three screens will appear, black, white and a brown response screen. 




(Rank Name)______________, you are the Red Squad Leader.  Click the button. 
(Rank Name)______________, you are the leader Alpha Team Red Squad.  Click the 
button. 
(Rank Name)______________, you are the leader of Bravo Team Red Squad.  Click the 
button. 
Click the OK button in the yellow box. 
About the experiment 
In this training session, you will become familiar with the computer interface by 
practicing moving your icon on the map and by sending and receiving chat messages. 
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Team Leader condition 
This experiment is investigating the effects of the Team Leader (full) basis of issue of the 
Ground Soldier System.  You have all been issued the GSS system. 
Each of you has a map view of the world that shows your location and the locations of 
others in your platoon.  Each of you has a chat window for communications and can 
place dots - digital chem. lights - on the map to facilitate that communication. 
Squad Leader condition 
This experiment is investigating the effects of the Squad Leader (partial) basis of issue of 
the Ground Soldier System.  The Squad Leaders has been issued the GSS but the Team 
Leaders have not. 
What this means is that you have different displays and access to different sources of 
information.  However, each of you has a chat window for communications. 
Map 
Here is a map of the training area.  These are the grid coordinates. 
Questions 
If you have any questions during the training session, feel free to ask at any time.  During 
the experiment, if you have a technical question or run into a problem with the interface, 
raise your hand and we will help you. 
The parts of the interface 
The interface contains a map, a chat window, and several information boxes. 
Map 
The map shows a satellite image of the area.  The map consists of a grid of cells.  
Numbers above and to the left of the map are the grid coordinates. 
The one icon that you see on the map represents YOU (and the other members of your 
team) and YOUR position.  You have dismounted from a Stryker and are waiting for 
orders to move out. 
Squad Leader  --  That icon, with the number 1, represents you, individually.  That is 
your position in the map grid. 
Team Leaders  --  That icon, with the letters 1A or 1B, represents you and the three other 
members of your team.  The four of you occupy the same cell in the map grid. 
 47 
Team Leader condition:  Same Maps 
All of you have been issued the GSS/Land Warrior.  As a result, all three of you see the 
same information on the same map. 
Squad Leader condition:  Different Maps 
Only the Squad Leader has been issued the GSS/Land Warrior.  As a result, you three are 
looking at different maps. 
Team leaders -- move to look at the Squad Leader’s Screen.  The GSS enables him to see 
a lot more of the world than you. 
Squad Leader -- look at one of the Team Leaders’ screens.  He has no GSS.  His map 
shows only that part of the world within his line of sight. 
Chat 
To the right of the map is the chat window.  Think of it as your radio / chat tool.  The 
upper portion is where you receive communications.  The lower portion is where you 
type the message you want to send.  Click on the send button below the window to 
actually send a message.  Hitting return inserts a line.  It does not send your message. 
Team Leaders - you have one send button.  The Squad Net.  Use it to send messages to 
the Squad Leader and to the other Team Leader. 
Squad Leader - you have two send buttons.  One of the Platoon Net and one for your 
Squad Net.  You will receive orders and SIGINTS from the Platoon Leader on the 
Platoon Net.  To send messages to the Team Leaders, you need to use the Squad Net. 
Chat or Huddle 
Now, an important point:  With one exception, we do not want you to talk or shout during 
the experiment.  For all radio communications, use the chat window.  Is that understood? 
There is one exception.  When the Squad Leader wants to bring the Team Leaders to him, 
we can call for a ‘huddle’.  Your icons must be in adjacent cells on the map and then you 
can get out of your chair and walk over to Squad Leader.  The three of you can then make 
plans or ‘draw in the sand’, etc. 
Unit Palette, etc. 
Across the top of the screen are boxes with useful information.  On the left is the clock. 
The most important of the boxes is the Unit Palette.  It contains a single white icon that 
represents you (SL) or you and your team (TL).  To the right of the icon is the short-hand 
name for you or your team. 
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You will be pointing and clicking on the icon and/or name in the Unit Palette to indicate 
that you want to move your icon on the map. 
Symbol Palette:  Chem Lights 
One of the features of the GSS/Land Warrior is the ability to put digital chem. lights on 
the map. 
Team Leader BOI: 
As you have all been issued the GSS/Land Warrior, each of you has a Symbol Palette.  
The Symbol Palette enables you to place and see chem lights on the map.  The chem. 
lights are represented by colored dots.  Once the practice session starts, you will practice 
placing chem. lights on the map. 
Squad Leader BOI: 
Squad Leader - you have a Symbol Palette but the Team Leaders do not because they 
have not been issued the GSS/Land Warrior.  The Symbol Palette enables you to place 
and to see chem lights on the map. The Team Leaders will not see the chem. lights on the 
map.  Once the practice session starts, the Squad Leader will practice placing chem. 
lights on the map. 
Questions 
Any questions about the interface and its layout? 
Start the Session 




As soon as the session starts, icons appear that represent the other members of your squad 
and the platoon leader.  The icon with the X is the platoon leader.  The icon with the 1 is 
the squad leader.  Alpha Team is shown by 1A.  Bravo Team by 1B. 
The clock is moving. 
Chat 
Input 
Everybody  --  in the lower box of the chat window type Guidons, radio check, over. 
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Use the button at the bottom of the window to send your message to the other members 
of your squad. 
Squad Leader -- use the SquadNet button to send messages to the Team Leaders.  Use the 
PlatoonNet button to send messages to the Platoon Leader. 
Can you see the messages from the other two guys?  Can you tell who sent which 
message? 
Everybody -- send a reply using standard radio procedures.  Roger, over. 
Got it?  That’s really all there is to using the chat window. 
Chat cut and paste 
Squad Leader  --  You will be receiving messages from the Platoon Leader or Allied 
Command.  These messages will come in on the Platoon Net.  The Team Leaders do not 
have access to the Platoon Net. 
What this means is that if you want to forward information from the Platoon Leader to 
the Team Leaders you can use copy and paste.  Copy from the upper window, paste into 
the lower window, add whatever you want to add - like operational orders - and send 
your message using the SquadNet. 
For example, here is a message from the Platoon Leader that you might want to forward 
to the Team Leaders after you add operational orders. 
PL: 
SIGINT indicates IED cell activity south of the mosque.  Commence cordon and search. 
Practice the copy and paste.  Don’t worry about the operational orders yet. 
Team Leaders -- did you get the communication about the SIGINT? 
Chat or Huddle 
During the experiment we want you to communicate using the chat window ONLY.  No 
yelling, no passing notes.  There is one exception.  The Squad Leader can call a ‘huddle’ 
where the three of you gather together to ‘draw in the sand’ etc. 
Team Leaders:  Your icons need to be in adjacent cells before you can get out of your 
chairs and walk over the Squad Leader. 
Digital Chem Lights 
The chem. lights are represented by colored dots. 
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Team Leader BOI: 
Everyone  --  Select a yellow chem. light.  Click somewhere in the big palm grove. 
Can you see three chem. lights? 
Change the color of the light you placed on the map by selecting a different color dot in 
the palette and placing it on top of the old one.  Use the ‘none’ color to erase your chem. 
light.   
Squad Leader BOI: 
Squad Leader  --  Select a yellow chem. light.  Click somewhere in the big palm grove.  
Change the color of the light you placed on the map by selecting a different color dot in 
the palette and placing it on top of the old one.  Use the ‘none’ color to erase your chem. 
light. 
Remember - the Team Leaders cannot see chem. lights. 
Moving your icon 
Moving your icon on the map takes two steps.  First you select it using the Unit Palette.  
Then you select a cell on the map that marks your intended location - where you will 
move to. 
The first step is to click on the icon in the Unit Palette.  This often takes two clicks, first 
on the icon followed by a click on the first letter of the icon name.  What you want is for 
the icon to light up.  As soon as it lights up, the system knows you intend to move your 
icon on the map. 
Try it.  Select your icon in the unit palette.  Make it light up. 
The second step is to click on the cell in the map where you want to move to.  I suggest 
you all move three or four cells west. 
Do it again.  Move several cells north.  Remember to start by making the icon in the Icon 
Palette light up. 
Got it? 
Now you can move and chat.  Time to practice a mission. 
Squad move #1 
PL puts blue light 26 20 
PL: 
1st Squad  Move from current location to the blue chem light. 
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Team Leader BOI: 
Team Leaders -- Wait for your orders and get ready to move out. 
Squad Leader -- the Team Leaders can see the blue chem. light.  Use the chat window to 
direct your squad.  Have Alpha Team take the lead.  Your mission. 
Squad Leader BOI: 
Team Leaders -- Wait for your orders and get ready to move out. 
Squad Leader -- the Team Leaders CANNOT see the blue chem. light.  Use the chat 
window to direct your squad.  Have Alpha Team take the lead.  Your mission. 
Squad move #2 
Let’s practice that again.  Same drill, different chem. light. 
PL puts yellow light 28 26 
PL: 
1st Squad Move from current location to the yellow chem light 
Squad Leader  --  Your mission. 
About Houses and Roads 
You need to know that the system is programmed to take you in as direct a line as 
possible from your starting point to your intended position.  If there is a house in the 
direct path, you will move through it.  Trying to move through a house is not a good idea.  
It takes a long time.  If there is a house between you and your destination, it is probably a 
good idea to go around using several short segments.  Complete one segment before 
starting another.  A straight line is not necessarily the fastest path. 
You can move fast down some of the main roads.  The main roads are great for covering 
ground quickly.  However, the bad guys have been known to put IEDs on the main roads. 
Bottom line:  choose your routes carefully. 
Squad move #3 
PL puts blue light 35 37 
PL: 
1st Squad Move from current location to establish a squad blocking position at blue chem 
light 
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Team Leader BOI: 
Squad Leader -- the Team Leaders can see chem. lights that you put on the map.  Use the 
yellow chem. light to show the path.  Use the chat window to issue your orders. 
Squad Leader BOI: 
Squad Leader -- the Team Leaders CANNOT see the blue chem. light.  Use the chat 
window to issue your orders. 
Insurgents 
Unhappy face 41 37 
Insurgents show themselves in mosque courtyard. 
When noticed, 
This is what an insurgent looks like.  (red unhappy face)  When you are around, they tend 
to stay undercover.  If you can see one, you can assume he has hostile intentions.  All 
insurgents are well armed and are willing to die. 
This is what they look like after you have killed them (green smiley face). 
Ammo 
To the Team Leader who has depleted ammo.  How much ammo have you got now?  (32-
45 usually).  You started with 60.  You spend N 'rounds' to take care of the insurgents. 
Squad Leader:  How much ammo have you got?  (10).  You have 10 because you are 1 
guy.  They have 60 because they are 4, 1 has a SAW.  Squad Leader - if you take on an 
insurgent alone, you are likely to die.  The implication is that it might be wise to have a 
Team take the lead. 
Questions ? 
Etiquette at the end of a session 
A session ends when time runs out OR you achieve your mission, whichever happens 
first. 
DO NOT click on the red X, ever.  When the session ends, wait for me to shut the system 
down. 
<Stop manager …  Exit> 
I have shut the system down.  What you see now are the Marines on Iwo Jima, a white 
Applet screen, and a black system screen. 
Click on the X in the upper right corner of the black screen. 
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Asking for help 
If you have trouble with the interface, get our attention.  We will help you. 
If you mess up on your mission, you can ask for assistance. 
If you get completely bogged down, one of us might make a suggestion. 
Questions? 
Questions? 
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APPENDIX 5. TACTICAL BRIEF 
Background 
Seven years after the American invasion of Iraq, the country remains mired in a new 
round of political turmoil following in the wake of indecisive parliamentary elections.  
The initial results of the March 7 vote showed the coalition led by a secular candidate, 
Allawi, taking a slim lead over the slate of Prime Minister al-Maliki, with 91 seats to 89.  
Mr. Allawi, although a Shiite, benefited from a surge in voting by Sunnis, many of whom 
boycotted earlier elections. 
Mr. Maliki vigorously challenged the results, but Mr. Allawi's narrow lead survived a 
recount.  Mr. Maliki also forged an alliance between his coalition and the other major 
Shiite bloc, a move that cleared the way for a Shiite-dominated government for the next 
four years.  Together they are only four votes short of a majority, leading many to expect 
that they might reach a deal with Kurdish parties, once the Kurds extract new promises of 
expanded autonomy.  That would recreate the coalition that ruled for the last four years, 
and could leave Sunnis feeling left out in the cold once again. 
The political impasse has disgusted many ordinary Iraqis, who are deeply cynical about 
their political class.  The decision of the Shiite parties to band together has revived 
sectarian tensions that are never far from the surface and has raised the specter of even 
more violence. 
While the level of violence has plunged from the carnage of 2006 and 2007, suicide 
bombers continue to attack, seemingly at will, plunging Baghdad into chaos on a regular 
basis and undercutting Mr. Maliki's claims to have restored security.  IED attacks along 
the major roadways bisecting or adjacent sectarian enclaves are also becoming more 
frequent and are designed to disrupt commerce, the tactical mobility of Iraqi and 
Coalition forces, and further discredit the Maliki government’s claims of restored security 
throughout the country.  Mr. Maliki's use of the military and security forces to settle 
political disputes have also raised alarms, and put the Americans in the awkward middle.  
Political disputes between Arabs and Kurds in the north also continue to fester.  With no 
sign of a resolution in sight for ordinary Iraqis who are the continuous victims of this 
myriad of frictions, increasing violence and civilian death tolls have prompted Coalition 
Forces to once again take a more active role to intervene. 
Your battalion is headquartered at CAMP TAJI.  A very active IED Cell has emerged to 
the east of Taji; operating with virtual impunity along MSR 2 over the last four months.  
Data and information collected from multi-source intelligence assets has led the S2 to 
conclude that the cell has established at least three safe haven areas near where the 
majority of the IED events have occurred.  The areas are labeled OBJs Orlando, Tampa, 
and Miami.  As a result, the battalion has designated AO Lion and reestablished two 
company sized COPs within the area to facilitate continuous operations designed to find 
and destroy the cell leaders and production facilities.  Your company occupies COP 
 56 
UTAH located south of OBJ Miami.  The company employs two platoons and the scouts 
in continuous reconnaissance patrolling and counter-IED ambushes, while maintaining a 
platoon TST element.  Your platoon has been actively patrolling in the area for at least 
the last 2 weeks along with 3rd PLT and the Scouts.  48 hours ago, your platoon became 
the TST unit and expects to rotate back to patrolling after 7 days. 
Situation 
A counter-IED ambush succeeded in spotting an IED emplacement element at work 
earlier today and cued a RAVEN UAV in order to follow the team back to their safe 
house.  A squad patrolling in the area from 3rd platoon was vectored onto the IED team 
and succeeded in capturing them before they could ditch or destroy their cell phones.  
The numbers captured from the cells have provided a selector for the IED cell leader who 
has yet to discover the compromise and failed to hit his timed OPSEC schedule to switch 
phones.  SIGINT has pinpointed the selector at GRID 40 38 within OBJ MIAMI.  Your 
platoon has received the TST raid mission to kill or capture the IED cell leader. 
Mission 
1st PLT attacks seize OBJ BOMBER vic GRID 40 38 NLT DTG in order to kill or 
capture IED cell leader and prevent further attacks along MSR2. 
Concept of the operation 
The platoon executes a cordon and search conducted in three phases: approach, 
establishment of the cordon, and assault /search.  The cordon forces will consist of both 
Stryker Sections (outer cordon) and 1st and 2nd Squads (inner cordon).  The assault force 
is 3rd squad. 
Scheme of maneuver 
Phase I (Approach) 
Platoon approaches the identified objective area mounted along ROUTE GOLD to a 
dismount point vic GRID 35 12. The Stryker Sections herring bone at the dismount point 
and squads form a hasty security perimeter with Red at 7 o’clock, White at 2 o’clock, and 
Blue at 11 o’clock.  The dismount point is the squad level release point for continued 
movement by squad infiltration into the target objective area.  On order, squads continue 
dismounted - Red infiltrates along AXIS CAT, White along AXIS GERBIL, and Blue 
along AXIS DOG 
Phase II (Establishment of the Cordon) 
RED1 occupies BLOCKING POS marked with BLUE CHEMLITE vic GRID 35 47 in 
order to isolate OBJ BOMBER and prevent escape to the N and NW.  WHITE1 move to 
and occupy BLOCKING POS marked with BLUE CHEMLITE vic GRID 55 41 in order 
to isolate OBJ BOMBER and prevent escape to the E and NE.  RAVEN7 maintains 
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section at original DISMOUNT PT in order to prevent reinforcement from the south and 
expedite evacuation of the objective area.  BLUE1 move to and seize ASLT POS vic 
GRID 34 30 marked with BLUE CHEMLITE in order synchronize cordon with ASLT on 
target. 
Phase III (Assault/Search) 
On order, ATK to seize OBJ BOMBER2 in order to kill or capture TGT (Hamadi).  
RED1, WHITE1, BLUE1 be prepared to exfil to original DISMOUNT PT or alternate 
LINKUP PT  after  BLUE1 reports BOMBER2 clear and TGT (Hamadi) secured.  On 
order all squads exfil to original DISMOUNT PT or designated LINKUP PT to remount 
and return to COP UTAH.  RAVEN7 be prepared to move to LINKUP PT marked with 
YELLOW CHEMLITE vic GRID 48 33 as an alternate to original DISMOUNT PT to 
remount squads or establish PLT CCP as needed. 
Service support 
Ammo:  Full Basic Load 
Individual Load:  Assault Rucks only.  Water = 6 Hours.  Batteries = 6 Hours 
PLT CCP:  GRID 48 33 
SIGINT:  Friendly forces will continue to monitor the identified selector 
UAV:  Continuous RAVEN UAV coverage during the operation. 
Command and signal 
Succession = PL, BLUE 1, PSG. 
PL & RTO with BLUE throughout. 
CHAT feature equals FM comms. 
 
SLANT = STRYKER/PAX/AMMO/MEDICAL 
 
AMMO: 
Green > 70% IBL on hand 
Amber > 40% IBL on hand 
Red > 20% IBL on hand 
Black < 20% IBL on hand 
 
MEDICAL: 
Green = No mission impact injuries or casualties 
Amber = Injury or casualties impact, but don’t prevent mission accomplishment 
Red = Injuries of casualties prevent mission accomplishment 
 
CALL SIGNS: 
PL =  RAVEN6 
PSG =  RAVEN7 
1SL =  RED1 
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A TL 1SQD =  RED2 
B TL 1SQD =  RED3 
2SL =  WHITE1 
A TL 2SQD =  WHITE2 
B TL 2SQD =  WHITE3 
3SL =  BLUE1 
A TL 3SQD =  BLUE2 
B TL 3SQD =  BLUE3 
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APPENDIX 6. SCRIPT FOR MISSION 1 (BLUE SQUAD) –  
ASSAULT ON SAFE HOUSE 
MISSION 1 .. Assault on safe house 
Immediately, Organize at the Dismount Point 
Red light  40 38 
 
Blue light 35 47 
Blue light 34 30 
Blue light 55 41 
 
PL: 
Guidons, this is RAVEN6.  SITREP over. 
 
1st Squad: 












Roger WHITE1, stand by. 
 
 
(3SQD:  RAVEN6 this is BLUE1.  SLANT 9/Green/Green.  Prepared to move AXIS 
DOG  over.) 
 
PL: 









This is RED1, WILCO, out. 
 
2SQD: 
This is WHITE1, WILCO, out. 
 
(3SQD:  This is BLUE1, WILCO, out.) 
 
 
Squads move to positions. 
Move RED and WHITE and PL units 
 
 
When there … 
When Squad 3 Blue gets to the Assault Position 
(3SQD:  RAVEN6 this is BLUE1.  |Set in ASLT POS with negative contact.  |Eyes on 
OBJ.  No activity noted.  |SLANT 9/Green/Green, over.) 
 
PL: 
BLUE1 this is RAVEN6, Roger, out. 
 
 
When Squad 1 Red gets to the NW Blocking Position 
1SQD: 




RED1 this is RAVEN6, Roger, out. 
 
 
When Squad 2 White gets to the NE Blocking Position 
2SQD: 




WHITE1 this is RAVEN6, Roger, out. 
 
 
When all Squads in Place … Scenario 1, Blue Assault 
PL: 




This is RED1, Roger, out. 
 
2SQD: 
This is WHITE1, Roger, out. 
 
(3SQD:  This is BLUE1, EXECUTING ASLT time now, out.) 
 
 
When all Insurgents are dead 
Blue light 46 32 
 
PL: 
Guidons this is Raven 6.|Mission complete - all targets have been killed or captured.  
|Move to Link UP VIC 46 32 marked with blue chem lite and await further orders. 
 
1SQD: 
This is RED1, Roger, out. 
 
2SQD: 
This is WHITE1, Roger, out. 
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APPENDIX 7. SCRIPT FOR MISSION 2 (RED SQUAD) –  
CORDON AND ADJUST TACTICAL POSITION 
MISSION 2 .. Northwest cordon and Adjust position 
Immediately, Organize at the Dismount Point 
Red light  40 38 
 
Blue light 35 47 
Blue light 34 30 
Blue light 55 41 
 
PL:   
Guidons, this is RAVEN6.  SITREP over. 
 
(1st Squad:  RAVEN6 this is RED1.  |SLANT 9/Green/Green.  |Prepared to move on 
AXIS CAT, over.) 
 
PL: 












RAVEN6 this is BLUE1.  |SLANT 9/Green/Green.  |Prepared to move AXIS DoG, over. 
 
PL: 




Guidons move out.  |RAVEN follows BLUE element, over. 
 
 




This is WHITE1, WILCO, out. 
 
3SQD: 
This is BLUE1, WILCO, out. 
 
 
Squads move to positions. 
Move WHITE and BLUE and PL units. 
 
 
When there … 
When Squad 3 Blue gets to the Assault Position 
3SQD: 
RAVEN6 this is BLUE1.  |Set in ASLT POS with negative contact.  |Eyes on OBJ.  No 
activity noted.  |SLANT 9/Green/Green, over. 
 
PL: 
BLUE1 this is RAVEN6, Roger, out. 
 
 
When Squad 2 White gets to the NE Blocking Position 
2SQD: 




WHITE1 this is RAVEN6, Roger, out. 
 
 
When Squad 1 Red gets to the NW Blocking Position 
(1SQD:  RAVEN6 this is RED1.  |Set in BLOCKING POS with negative contact.  
|SLANT 9/Green/Green, over.) 
 
PL: 
RED1 this is RAVEN6, Roger, out. 
 
 
When all Squads in Place …  Red FRAGO 
PL: 
Guidons this is RAVEN6.  |MUSTANG6 reports target (Hamadi) has moved NE to new 
location.  |I say again, MUSTANG6 reports target has moved to new location.  |Stand by 
for FRAGO, over. 
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(1SQD:  This is RED1, WILCO, over.) 
 
2SQD: 
This is WHITE1, WILCO, over. 
 
3SQD: 
This is BLUE1, WILCO, over. 
 
 
PL:  Red chem. light   64 47 
PL:  3 Blue chem. lights   54 52   78 46   65 36 




Guidons this is RAVEN6.  FRAGO follows.  Selector indicates target has moved NE to 
GRID 64 47 OBJ BOMBER2; marked with RED CHEMLITE.  |On order RED1 move to 
and occupy BLOCKING POS marked with BLUE CHEMLITE vic GRID 54 52 to 
isolate OBJ BOMBER2 and prevent escape to the N and NW.  |WHITE1 move to and 
occupy BLOCKING POS marked with BLUE CHEMLITE vic GRID 78 46 to isolate 
OBJ BOMBER2 and prevent escape to the E and NE.  |RAVEN7 maintain current cordon 
to the S and SE.  Be prepared to move to LINKUP PT marked with YELLOW 
CHEMLITE vic GRID 55 45 as an alternate to original DISMOUNT PT in order to 
expedite evacuation of the objective area.  |BLUE1 move to and seize ASLT POS vic 
GRID 65 36 marked with BLUE CHEMLITE to synchronize cordon with ASLT on 
target.  |On order, ATK to seize OBJ BOMBER2 in order to kill or capture TGT 
(Hamadi).  |RED1, WHITE1, BLUE1 be prepared to exfil to original DISMOUNT PT or 
alternate LINKUP PT after BLUE1 reports BOMBER2 clear and TGT (Hamadi) secured.  
|All elements report when prepared to move.  |Movement to OBJ BOMBER2 begins on 
my order.  |Report when set in BLOCKING and ASLT POS.  Initiate assault on my 
order.  Acknowledge over. 
 
(1SQD:  This is RED1, roger, over.) 
 
2SQD: 
This is WHITE1, roger, over. 
 
3SQD: 
This is BLUE1, roger, over. 
 
 
Shortly Thereafter … 
2SQD: 








RAVEN6 this is BLUE1.  SLANT 9/Green/Green.  Prepared to move, over. 
 
PL: 
Roger BLUE1, stand by. 
 
 
(1SQD:  RAVEN6 this is RED1.  SLANT 9/Green/Green.  Prepared to move, over.) 
 
PL: 
Roger RED1, Guidons move out, RAVEN follows BLUE element, over. 
 
 
(1SQD:  This is RED1, WILCO, out.) 
 
2SQD: 
This is WHITE1, WILCO, out. 
 
3SQD: 
This is BLUE1, WILCO, out. 
 
 
Squads Move to New Positions 









WHITE1 this is RAVEN6, Roger, out. 
 
3SQD: 
RAVEN6 this is BLUE1.  Set in ASLT POS with negative contact.  |Eyes on OBJ.  No 
activity noted.  |SLANT 9/Green/Green, over. 
 
PL: 
BLUE1 this is RAVEN6, Roger, out. 
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(1SQD:  RAVEN6 this is RED1.  Set in BLOCKING POS with negative contact.  
SLANT 9/Green/Green, over.) 
 
PL: 
RED1 this is RAVEN6, Roger.  
 
 
Blue force conducts assault of Bomber2 
PL: 
Guidons this is RAVEN6.  EXECUTE time now, over. 
 
 
(1SQD:  This is RED1, Roger, out.) 
 
2SQD: 
This is WHITE1, Roger, out. 
 
3SQD: 
This is BLUE1, EXECUTING ASLT time now, out. 
 
 
When all Insurgents are dead 
Blue light 46 32 
 
PL: 
Guidons this is Raven 6.|Mission complete - all targets have been killed or captured.  
|Move to Link Up point VIC 46,32 marked with blue chem lite and await further orders. 
 
(1SQD:  This is RED1, Roger, out.) 
 
2SQD: 
This is WHITE1, Roger, out. 
 
3SQD: 
This is BLUE1, Roger, out. 
 
END 
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APPENDIX 8. SCRIPT FOR MISSION 3 (WHITE SQUAD) – 
CORDON AND REINFORCE ENGAGED UNIT 
MISSION 3 .. Northeast cordon and Support unit under fire 
Immediately, Organize at the Dismount Point 
Red light 40 38 
 
Blue light 35 47 
Blue light 34 30 
Blue light 55 41 
 
PL:   
Guidons, this is RAVEN6.  SITREP over. 
 
1st Squad: 




Roger RED1, stand by. 
 
 








RAVEN6 this is BLUE1.  SLANT 9/Green/Green.  |Prepared to move AXIS DOG, over. 
 
PL: 








This is RED1, WILCO, out. 
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2SQD:  This is WHITE1, WILCO, out. 
 
3SQD: 
This is BLUE1, WILCO, out. 
 
Squads move to positions. 
Move RED and BLUE and PL units. 
 
 
When there … 
When Squad 3 Blue gets to the Assault Position 
3SQD: 
RAVEN6 this is BLUE1.  |Set in ASLT POS with negative contact.  |Eyes on OBJ.  No 
activity noted.  |SLANT 9/Green/Green, over. 
 
PL: 
BLUE1 this is RAVEN6, Roger, out. 
 
 
When Squad 1 Red gets to the NW Blocking Position 
1SQD: 




RED1 this is RAVEN6, Roger, out. 
 
 
When Squad 2 White gets to the NE Blocking Position 
(2SQD:  RAVEN6 this is White1.  |Set in BLOCKING POS with negative contact.  
|SLANT 9/Green/Green, over.) 
 
PL: 
WHITE1 this is RAVEN6, Roger, out. 
 
 
When all Squads in Place … White FRAGO … Support Unit under Fire 
Insurgent:  Icon at 41 38 
 
3SQD: 








RAVEN6 this is BLUE1, Contact GRID 41 38 |4-5 man element with AK47s continues 
to engage Bravo Team with effective fire from TGT location.  |Bravo has two wounded - 
one routine and one priority.  Unable to disengage.  |Alpha continues to suppress, but 
cannot gain fire superiority at this time.  |We are unable to determine if Hamadi remains 
in the Target location, |SLANT 9/Green/Amber, over. 
 
PL: 
This is RAVEN6, roger, stand by, over. 
 
Pause for FRAGO 
 
PL:  Blue chem. light   42 33 
PL:  Yellow chem. light   48 33 
 
PL: 
Guidons this is RAVEN6.  FRAGO follows.  |RED1 remain in BLOCKING POS to 
isolate OBJ BOMBER |and prevent escape to the N and NW or reinforcement from the 
N.  |WHITE1 move to and occupy ATTACK BY FIRE POS marked with BLUE 
CHEMLITE vic GRID 42 33 |to allow BLUE3 (BRAVO TM) to disengage and evacuate 
casualties.  |Initiate movement ASAP.  Report when moving and when set.  |RAVEN7 be 
prepared to move to LINKUP PT marked with YELLOW CHEMLITE vic GRID 48 33 
|to establish CCP and expedite possible evacuation of the objective area.   |BLUE1 
continue to engage from current locations in order to protect BLUE3.   |Be prepared to 
evacuate casualties to CCP vic GRID 48 33.   |I will link up with White1 in ABF POS 
when established.  |Acknowledge over. 
 
1SQD: 
This is RED1, roger, over. 
 
(2SQD:  This is WHITE1, roger move to ABF GRID 42 33 over.) 
 
3SQD:   
This is BLUE1, roger, over. 
 
 
Shortly Thereafter … 
(2SQD:  RAVEN6 this is WHITE1.  SLANT 9/Green/Green.  Moving time now, over.) 
 
PL: 
RAVEN6, Roger, over. 
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White Squad Moves to New Position 
Once There … 




WHITE1 this is RAVEN6, Roger, moving to your location time now, out. 
 
 
Move PL to 42 33 
 
PL: 
Blue hold and estab SBF.  White enter building at SE corner, over 
 
 
When all Insurgents are dead 
Yellow light 46 32 
 
PL: 
Guidons this is Raven 6.|Mission complete - all targets have been killed or captured.  
|Move to CCP VIC 46 32 marked with yellow chem lite and await further orders. 
 
1SQD: 
This is RED1, Roger, out. 
 
(2SQD:  This is WHITE1, Roger, out.) 
 
3SQD 
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